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ABSTRACT 
 
Background of Problem: This research investigates the corporate governance and performance 
between founding family firms and non-founding family firms in Hong Kong, and the 
performance inside founding family firms under three different management status.  Agency 
costs will be generated by the divergence between CEO interest and those of the outside 
shareholders if the owner-manager sells equity claims on the corporation. There are two 
different mainstreams of views regarding relationships between ownership and performance in 
family business: negative and positive effect generated from family ownership and control.  To 
what extents the two different views are relevant to Hong Kong family firms are still unclear. 
Research Method and Data: By focusing on Hong Kong business, this research seeks to study 
75 Hong Kong listed companies in HSCII for 5 years, yielding 347 observations, using 
archival data. The empirical result suggests that the founding family firms in Hong Kong may 
not outperform nonfamily firms, and the founding family firms with founders as CEOs are one 
of best performers among founding family firms. This research not only studies the 
performance behaviours of Hong Kong founding/ non-founding family business and inside 
founding family business, but also sets a foundation for further research. This research gives 
insights for entrepreneurs to manage their businesses and plan the succession of founding 
family business in Hong Kong. This research into corporate governance is different to that of 
countries such as USA, Taiwan, and Mainland China. The founding family firms in Hong 
Kong may not outperform the nonfamily firms and the founding family firms with the founder 
as CEO is one of the best management techniques inside founding family firms. This research 
shows agency costs inside founding family firms affects performance and succession of family 
firms, as descendants may not be the best successors for firm value maximization, and 
business continuity. Owners of Hong Kong founding family business should pay more 
attention on business governance and succussion planning. 
 
JEL Classifications: O16, M14, G32 
Keywords: Founding Family Business, Corporate Governance, Performance, 
Agency Costs 
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INTRODUCTION   
Family-controlled firms play a particularly important role in Asian countries (Chang, 
2003; Joh, 2003; Filatotchev, Lien, & Piesse, 2005). but, most studies of corporate 
ownership rely on Chinese firms such as Mainland China, Taiwan, not specially in 
Hong Kong firms (for example, Filatotchev et al. 2005, Xia 2008, Wu 2009, Chu 
2009, Fan 2013). Many studies have produced interesting results about Chinese 
family businesses.  This research is aimed at finding the ownership-performance 
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relationship inside Hong Kong founding family business under the Hang Seng 
Composite Industry Index. 
LITERATURE BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH 
In East Asian markets, more than 65% of listed firms are controlled by major 
shareholders and of those firms, 60% of the managers are family members of the 
major shareholders (Bruton, Ahlstrom, & Wan, 2003). Emerging in the 1950s to 
1970s, family businesses are one of the main business styles in Hong Kong, and most 
of them have reached a developing or mature stage. 
Over 65% of firms are founding family firms in Hong Kong (Claessens, 
Djankov, & Lang, 2000), which means that family business is the main model in the 
Hong Kong. In general, some people regard family business as one of best business 
governance models (such as Lee Kum Kee, Li & Fung), but there is no evidence to 
prove it yet in Hong Kong and there are some cases about family generated problems 
affecting the performance of their companies, such as Kwok’s family, Kung’s family 
and Chen’s family. Most studies of corporate ownership rely on Chinese firms such 
as Mainland China, Taiwan, not specially in Hong Kong firms (for example, 
Filatotchev et al. 2005, Xia 2008, Wu 2009, Chu 2009, Fan 2013). To what extent the 
differences of agency effect across individual countries in family firms is still 
ambiguous.   
This study focuses on Hong Kong founding family firms to fill in the gap of 
ownership-performance relationship and try to fulfil one of the knowledge gaps about 
the effect of agency cost among Asian countries. It is hoped this study not only extent 
the knowledge of family business and agency theory, but will also give insight for 
entrepreneurs to build the firm structure, avoid agency costs to shareholders, and 
transition their business to next generation or public business.  
 
RESEARCH PROBLEM AND QUESTIONS 
 
The research questions of the governance and performance between founding family 
business and non-founding family business, and inside founding family business in 
Hong Kong addressed in this research are: 
Research Question (1) Do founding family firms outperform non-founding 
family firms in Hong Kong? The first question aims to find the performance 
behaviours of founding family comparing with non-founding family business. Thus 
the following hypothesis will be tested. 
 
H1: In Hong Kong, founding family firms are positively associated with performance. 
 
Research Question (2) In Hong Kong founding family firms, to what extent does the 
relationship between different forms of management and performance exist? The 
second question aims to find which management status is the best choice during the 
operation of founding family business, especially giving the insight for the 
succession plan during transition. Thus the following hypothesis will be tested. 
H2-a: In Hong Kong, founding family firms managed by founders are positively 
associated with performance. 
 
H2-b: In Hong Kong, founding family firms managed by descendants are positively 
associated with performance. 
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H2-c: In Hong Kong, founding family firms managed by professional managers are 
positively associated with performance. 
 
This research is replicating Anderson and Reeb (2003) research in the U.S., but the 
secondary data of Hong Kong governance and performance is different than the U.S., 
the findings in this research may not cover all of the findings in Anderson and Reebs 
(2003) research, such as the nonlinear regression analysis. However, the analysis of 
the management status is more detailed in this research, and these findings give 
insights for Hong Kong founding family business in management and succession 
planning issues, which are urgent topics in Hong Kong family business (Fan, 2013). 
METHODOLOGY 
In the data collection section, the Hang Seng Composite Industry Index is used. The 
dependent variable is composited by Tobin’s Q, ROA (return on Assets) and, ROE 
(return on Equity). The owner and management status are the independent variables. 
The research also considers six control variables, which include industries, firm size, 
firm age, board size, board structure from percentage of independent non-directors, 
and board structure from number of family members on the board.  Since the data 
used to test the hypothesis is financial data and economic data, secondary data is 
collected from annual reports of companies in the Hong Kong Hang Seng Composite 
Industry index. After the data collection, descriptive and frequency analysis are 
presented to analyse the behaviours of the sample. In order to test the hypothesis, 
independent T-test, regression analysis is used.  
  
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
 
There are a total of 75 firms in 9 industries, and 3 industries including Properties & 
Construction (20), Consumer Goods (18), and the Services (15) industry constitute 
over 20 % of the population. Over 65% of firms are Founding Family Businesses, 
inside the founding family business (49), there are 23 firms with a CEO founder, 17 
firms with a CEO descendant, and 9 firms who hired their CEO. 
In relation to the age of the firms, some firms are over hundred years (197 
years) old, but some firms are established in the 21st century (only 4 years old). The 
average age is 41.47. In firm size, Total Assets are from HKD 1,830,352,000 to HKD 
720,854,400,000, and its average is almost HKD 6,977,302,675. This study will 
standardize the Total Assets with Ln, so it can be more suitable to build the 
regression function. 
In the board structure, the average board size in 11 ranging from 5 to 21. As 
requested by the Law of Company Corporations, all firms have Independent Non-
Executive Directors from 21% to 60% in relation to board size. In founding family 
firms, the Percentage of Family Members on the Board is from 0% to 59% with an 
average of 17.41%. 
In regards to firm performance, Tobin’s Q is ranging from 0.53 to 5.27, and 
the average is 1.67. This means that the population’s average market value is greater 
than the value of the company's recorded assets. ROA_PAtS is ranging from -6% to 
28%, the average ROA is 8.23%. ROE_PAtS is ranging from -17% to 92%, the 
average ROA is 14.34%.  It shows that the firms in this study are performing well 
during 2008 to 2012, since the average growth of Hong Kong GDP is 2.8% (Census 
and Statistics Department General Statistics Section, 2012; Census and Statistics 
Department General Statistics Section., 2013). 
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TABLE 1 DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF FIRM 
 
 
N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Age 75 4 197 41.47 35.445 
Board Size 75 5 21 11.11 3.198 
Percentage of 
Independent non- 
Executive director 
75 .21 .60 .3650 .09812 
Percentage. of Family 
Members in Board 
75 .00 .59 .1741 .16893 
Total Assets 75 1.83E9 7.21E11 6.9773E10 1.16252E11 
Tobin’s Q 75 .53 5.27 1.6687 1.07852 
ROA_PAtS 75 -.06 .28 .0823 .06519 
ROE_PAtS 75 -.17 .92 .1434 .14449 
Valid N (listwise) 75     
 
There are 228 out of 347 data from the Founding Family Businesses, which are over 
65% of the population. Inside the founding family businesses, there are 103 
observations with a CEO founder, 86 observations with a CEO descendant, and 39 
observations with a hired CEO. There are a total of 347 observations from 9 
industries.  Particularly 3 industries among the 9 industries including Properties & 
Construction (20), Consumer Goods (18), and Services (15) industry are over 19 % 
of the population. The data is an average from 2008 to 2012.  
 
TABLE 2 OWNER FREQUENCIES ANALYSIS OF OBSERVATION 
 
 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Non Founding Family 
Business 
119 34.3 34.3 34.3 
Founding Family 
Business 
228 65.7 65.7 100.0 
Total 347 100.0 100.0  
 
 
TABLE 3 MANAGEMENT STATUS FREQUENCIES ANALYSIS OF 
OBSERVATION 
 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid CEO Non-FFB 119 34.3 34.3 34.3 
CEO founder 103 29.7 29.7 64.0 
CEO descendant 86 24.8 24.8 88.8 
CEO hire 39 11.2 11.2 100.0 
Total 347 100.0 100.0  
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TABLE 4 FISCAL YEAR FREQUENCIES ANALYSIS OF 
OBSERVATION 
 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 2008 58 16.7 16.7 16.7 
2009 71 20.5 20.5 37.2 
2010 72 20.7 20.7 57.9 
2011 73 21.0 21.0 79.0 
2012 73 21.0 21.0 100.0 
Total 347 100.0 100.0  
 
TABLE 5 INDUSTRY FREQUENCIES ANALYSIS OF OBSERVATION 
 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid ENE 5 1.4 1.4 1.4 
MAT 23 6.6 6.6 8.1 
IND 15 4.3 4.3 12.4 
CSG 77 22.2 22.2 34.6 
SER 69 19.9 19.9 54.5 
TEL 14 4.0 4.0 58.5 
P&C 95 27.4 27.4 85.9 
IT 24 6.9 6.9 92.8 
CGM 25 7.2 7.2 100.0 
Total 347 100.0 100.0  
 
 
Most of the boards are composited with around 11 members with average 11.13, and 
the largest board size is 22 members, and the smallest is 5. Most of companies are 
composited with 4 to 5 Executive directors.  For Independent Non-Executive 
Directors, most of companies will hire 3 to 4 members because the HKEX specifies a 
provision on this. The largest number of Independent Non-Executive Directors is 8 
members.  
Because there are 119 non founding family firms and some founding family 
firms without family members in boards, there are 123 observations with 0 family 
members on the board. Generally, there are 1 to 3 family members in board of 
founding family firms. The Descriptive Analysis of Observation is the same as the 
descriptive of the Firm, as the Descriptive Statistics of the Firm is generated from the 
averaged data of observation. 
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TABLE 6 DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF OBSERVATION 
 
 
N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Age 347 4 197 41.90 35.880 
Board Size 347 5 22 11.13 3.289 
Percentage of 
Independent non- 
Executive director 
347 .14 .67 .3666 .10317 
Percentage. of Family 
Members in Board 
347 .00 .64 .1744 .16968 
Total Assets 347 7.26E8 8.04E11 7.1384E10 1.21745E11 
Tobin’s Q 347 .08 6.57 1.6089 1.17057 
ROA_PAtS 347 -.61 .37 .0784 .08298 
ROE_PAtS 347 -1.62 1.47 .1342 .18422 
Valid N (listwise) 347     
 
For the performance between non founding family business and founding family 
business, Tobin’s Q and ROA  of Non Founding Family Business is larger than the 
Founding Family Business. But the ROE_PAtS of Non Founding Family Business is 
less than the Founding Family Business.  
 
TABLE 7 GROUP STATISTICS OF OWNER 
 
 Owner 
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Tobin’s Q Non Founding Family 
Business 
119 1.6426 1.14116 .10461 
Founding Family 
Business 
228 1.5914 1.18773 .07866 
ROA_PAtS Non Founding Family 
Business 
119 .0727 .08641 .00792 
Founding Family 
Business 
228 .0813 .08117 .00538 
ROE_PAtS Non Founding Family 
Business 
119 .1160 .17868 .01638 
Founding Family 
Business 
228 .1437 .18673 .01237 
 
For the performance among management status, firm performance of a CEO founder 
is better than others in all variables including Tobin’s Q, ROA and ROE.  In Tobin’s 
Q, the CEO Non-FFB (1.64) is only the next to the CEO founder. In ROA, a hired 
CEO is the worst performing with 6.37%, and in ROE, CEO Non-FFB performs 
worst with11.6%.  
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TABLE 8 CORRELATION DATA
 
 
Founding-family firm appears to bear a positive association with accounting 
measures of firm performance (ROA, ROE), and negative association with market 
measures of firm performance (Tobin’s Q).  There are positive relationships between 
founding-family firm and firm size, board size, but negative relationships with 
Independent Non-Executive Directors and firm age. In consistent with previous 
analysis, there is a negative relation between family ownership and percentage of 
independent non-executive director, firm age. Because firm age, firm size, percentage 
of family member in board and market performance are negatively correlated, the 
following section will use multivariate analysis to examine the relation between 
family presence and firm performance. 
 
TABLE 9 RESULTS OF THE HYPOTHESES TESTING 
 
Hypotheses Descriptions  
 
Testing results  
 
H1 In Hong Kong, founding family firms are positively 
associated with performance 
Not supported & not statistically associated 
H2-a In Hong Kong, family firms managed by founders are 
positively associated with performance 
Supported & significantly and positively correlated 
in marketing performance 
H2-b In Hong Kong,  family firms managed by successors are 
positively associated with performance 
Not supported & not statistically associated 
H2-c In Hong Kong, family firms managed by professional 
managers are positively associated with performance 
Not supported & not statistically associated 
 
In relation to the Hypothesis posed, the results are as follows: 
Result 1: The marketing performance (Tobin Q) of non-founding family firms may 
be better than that of the founding family firm. The accounting performance (ROA, 
ROE) of the founding family firm may be better than that of a non-founding family 
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firm. But there is not a significant difference between ownership for the firm 
performance in regards to market and accounting indexs. 
Result 2: The performance (Tobin Q, ROA, ROE) of founding family firm with a 
CEO founder is better than that of a founding family firm with a CEO descendant 
and CEO hire. There is a significant difference between CEO founder and  CEO 
descendant/ CEO hire in regards to market and accounting indexs.  
Result 3: The market performance and accounting performance with ROE of CEO 
descendant is worse than CEO founder. In ROA, CEO descendant may be only better 
than CEO hire. But there is not a significant difference between CEO descendant and 
CEO hire for the firm performance in regards to market and accounting indexs, 
except for the relationshp between CEO descendant and CEO founder. 
Result 4: The market performance of CEO hire may be only better than CEO 
descendant.  In ROE, CEO hire may be only better than CEO descendant. But there is 
not a significant difference between CEO hire and CEO descendant for the firm 
performance in regards to market and accounting indexs, except between CEO hire 
and CEO founder. 
Result 5:  In OLS Regression with dummy variables, Owner, Board Size, Percentage 
of Family Members in Board, Management Status are significant with Tobin Q. 
Owner, Ln_Age, Board Size, Percentage of Independent non- Executive director are 
significant with ROA. Owner, Percentage. of Family Members in Board, Ln_Age are 
significant with ROE. 
Result 6:  In IV-2SLS Regression,  the result is consistent with the OLS results. 
Result 7:  There is no nonlinear regression model constructed with the collected data, 
since some data is missing, such as the fractional equity ownership of the firm’s 
founding family, R/D expenses, depreciation, and amortization, and so on. 
 
TABLE 10 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
 
Index  Contributions  Implications 
1 Some research findings in this study do confirm expectations from 
the extant literature but they extent knowledge body in family 
business research in Hong Kong 
Academic 
2 The finding of performance in management status and in 
governance may enrich the theory of agency cost in Hong Kong. 
Academic  
3 The finding of performance in management status and in 
governance may enrich knowledge body of business governance in 
Hong Kong. 
Academic 
4 The research also gives further research suggestions on the 
ownership and performance, and the succession of family business. 
Academic 
5 The finding of performance between founding family and non-
founding family business may give insight to entrepreneur or 
scholars about the founding family behaviours of Hong Kong. 
Industrial 
6 Since Hong Kong is facing a succession era in 21 century, the 
research may give the insight for the sustainability development of 
family business. 
Industrial 
7 The studies also focus on the board structure of Independent Non-
Executive Director and Family Members in Board, which may give 
insight for entrepreneur to build their board of the companies. 
Industrial 
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CONCLUSIONS 
This research into corporate governance and performance in Hong Kong founding 
family firms finds that the behaviours of Hong Kong founding family firms are 
different with other founding family firms, such as USA, Taiwan, and Mainland 
China. The founding family firms in Hong Kong may not outperform the nonfamily 
firms and the founding family firms with founder as CEO is one of best management 
status in side founding family firms. The agency cost inside founding family firms 
affects the performance and succussion of family firms. Owners of Hong Kong 
founding family business should pay more attention on their business governance and 
succussion planning, as descendants may not be the best successors for firm value 
maximization, and founding family business continuity.   
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